Private Law: Persons by Tête, W. Thomas
Louisiana Law Review 
Volume 31 
Number 2 The Work of the Louisiana Appellate 
Courts for the 1969-1970 Term: A Symposium 
February 1971 
Article 3 
2-1-1971 
Private Law: Persons 
W. Thomas Tête 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
W. Thomas Tête, Private Law: Persons, 31 La. L. Rev. (1971) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol31/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 
1971] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1969-1970 189
And further,
"Those decisions will be the means of improving legislation,
but will not be laws themselves; the departments of gov-
ernment will be kept within their proper spheres of action.
The Legislature will not judge, nor the Judiciary make
laws."13
PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
W. Thomas Tgte*
In Tannehill v. Tannehill1 plaintiff sued to have his mar-
riage declared null and to disavow the child born to his pur-
ported wife. The trial court sustained exceptions of no cause
of action as to both claims. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal
reversed the exception as to the claim of nullity, but sustained
it as to the action of disavowal. However, two judges dissented
on the question of the action of disavowal.
The action of nullity rested in part upon article 3941 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had
obtained a divorce in LaSalle Parish purporting to dissolve a
previous marriage while she and her husband were both domi-
ciled in Winn Parish. Article 3941 provides that an action for
divorce must be brought in the parish of domicile or of last
matrimonial domicile under penalty of absolute nullity. The
defendant's exception to the action of nullity was based upon
"the strong jurisprudential rule preventing collateral attack
upon divorce decree," a rule stated in Wilson v. Calvin.2
The court of appeal correctly distinguished the Wilson case
from that before it on the ground that the Wilson ruling ex-
pressly barred collateral attacks on decisions only on "errors
or irregularities not jurisdictional,"s whereas the error in venue
in the divorce purporting to dissolve Mrs. Tannehill's previous
marriage was one that was jurisdictional under article 44 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The court, however, indicated uncer-
13. Id., 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES LXXXV, XCIII (1937).
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. 226 So.2d 185 (LA. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
2. 221 La. 451, 59 So.2d 451 (1952).
3. Id. at 453, 59 So.2d at 453. (Emphasis added.)
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tainty as to the correctness of its decision on the ground that
"to permit collateral attacks such as the present is unwise and
* . . may well have not been contemplated by the redactors of
the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure."4
It is puzzling that the court treated the issue as one of
purely procedural law. Nowhere in the decision is the applicable
substantive law mentioned. If one turns to the applicable articles
of the Civil Code, it becomes clear that the court reached the
right result in Tannehill with respect to the action for nullity.
The substantive ground of the claim of the nullity of the
Tannehill marriage must be article 93 of the Civil Code which
prohibits married persons from contracting other marriages un-
til the existing marriage is dissolved by law. Under article 113
of the Civil Code the incapacity stated in article 93 is one which
"may be impeached either by the married person [persons]
themselves, or by any person interested, or by the Attorney-
General . . . ." The court could not have decided otherwise in
Tannehill without destroying the absolute character of the nul-
lity established in article 113. Any intent of the redactors of the
Code of Civil Procedure to limit collateral attacks on judgments
would have to yield to the positive substantive law, at least
absent a clear expression of this intent.
The court's decision on the other exception of no cause of
action is more dubious, as the dissent of two judges points up.
The primary ground urged by plaintiff to disavow a child born
to his wife was that he could not be the father as he is "sterile
because of a childhood disease and is thus biologically incapable
of producing spermatozoa to conceive a child . . . ."5 The court
of appeal based its decision upon the restrictive jurisprudence
of Williams v. Williams6 and its questionable progeny7 and the
proposition that the "Civil Code lists only five grounds for dis-
4. 226 So.2d 185, 187 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
5. Id. at 188. Theodore Tannehill also sought to disavow the child on the
ground of the nullity of his marriage and, in a separately stated claim, to
have the child declared not legitimate on the ground that possible civil effects
of the marriage as putative did not extend to the child In this case. It would
seem that the former claim could not really be supported as a separate
cause of action and Is merely a restatement of the claim as to the lack of
civil effects of a putative marriage which the court did not reach.
6. 230 La. 1, 87 So.2d 707 (1956).
7. See Lambert v. Lambert, 164 So.2d 661 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), and
Comment, 23 L.A. L. REv. 759 (1963).
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avowal, none of which include the sterility of the husband
"8
The dissenting judges correctly pointed out that almost all
the pertinent "articles are written in the negative," excluding
certain grounds and that "[t] o say that the redactors of the Code
meant to establish in these short paragraphs the only method by
which the legitimacy of a child could be contested" would be
"to do an injustice to the intelligence of those men who were
the writers of a Code on which the majority of our law is based."9
The truth of the dissenting judges' observation on this point is
borne out by the legislative history of article 313 of the Code
Napoleon from which article 185 was drawn and which is iden-
tical to it. The Projet of the French Code Civil, like the Louisiana
Digest of 1808, provided that non-paternity could not be proved
by the "natural or accidental impotence of the husband,"'10 but
after considerable debate the words "or accidental"" were
stricken in order that accidental impotence, a ground not set
forth explicitly, might be urged in an action to disavow.12
8. 226 So.2d 185, 188 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
9. Id. at 191.
10. For the relevant provision of the Projet of the French Code, see 10
FENET, RECUE1L COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DU CODE CIvIL 3-4 (1836):
"L'enfant conqu pendant le mariage a pour pare le marl.
"La 1ot n'admet contre cette paternit6, ni 'exception d'adultre de la part
de la femme, ni l'allegation d'impuissance naturelle ou accidentelle de la part
du marl."
For the relevant provision of the Louisiana Digest of 1808, see La. Digest
of 1808, bk. 1, tit. VII, art. 7 at 44.
11. See FRENCH Crv. CODE art. 313; 10 FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX
PREPARATOmES Du CODE CxvnL 11 (1836).
12. See 10 FENET, RECUzrL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DU CODE
CvL 5 n. (1836), a passage drawn from MEMOIRES DI M. THIBAUDEAU SUR LE
CONSULAT 49-52. The following is the writer's translation of part:
"The First Consul: The consequence of adultery is not always a child.
If a woman sleeps with her husband and with another man, one should
presume the child belongs to the husband. It is not evident that it isn't his,
it is very possible that he is the father of it. Impotence is a vague word, it
could be only temporary. This is not a question of the interest of the wife,
but of that of the child. The potency of the husband is proved by the
existence of the child. What physician could say what the sickness is that
renders one impotent and can give assurance that a germ of potency does
not remain. It is otherwise when one opposes the physical fact of the
absence of the husband (to the claim of legitimacy). .. ."
The Second Consul insists upon these two exceptions in certain cases.
"The First Consul: While there is a possibility that the child is the
husband's, the law-maker should clasp his hand over his eyes. The child
should be regarded as an Interested third party."
The Second Consul is aroused against the inflexibility of the principle.
"The First Consul: You, who have experience at the bar, you have
never seen impotence. When it needs to be proved, the wife always says
the child proves the potency. In this contest, who will take care of the
interests of the child, if it is not the law. There should be a fixed rule to
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Nonetheless there are questionable points in the reasoning
of the dissenting judges. Their argument rests upon the legit-
imacy of distinguishing impotence from sterility. Although the
former could not be urged (if it were natural) under article
185, the latter might not be excluded by that article. However,
it is probable that the word impotence as it was used in 1825
included sterility as well as the inability to perform the sexual
act.18 Yet the dissenting judges are correct in drawing this dis-
lighten all the doubts. It is said that this is against good morals. No, because
if the absolute principle were not adopted, the wife would say to the
husband, Why do you wish to hamper my liberty? If you suspect my virtue,
you have the means of proving that the child isn't yours. One should not
tolerate this. The husband ought to have an absolute power and the right
to say: Madame, you will not go out, you will not go to the comedy, you
will not see such or such a person, because the children which you will
make will be mine. .... "
"Maleville: But suppose the husband becomes impotent by a wound,
a gunshot. There are cases of it."
"The First Consul: One should perhaps allow accidental impotence. But
it must be clear as the sun. All the rest is only illusion."
Maleville, after agreeing in general with the spirit of the Projet on the
subject, added:
"But there is a kind of accidental impotence which can be encountered
after the marriage, whether because of battles or for some other cause, which
cannot leave the least doubt, and one should not bar by an absolute rule the
exceptions which can be produced." Id. at 10.
Napoleon responded that he thought it best to limit the exception (of
impotence) to accidental impotence, but that it was not possible to recognize
natural impotence, adding: "The law maker should not try to penetrate within
the secrets that nature has hidden from him; besides, her silence is in the
interest of children. Accidental impotence, to the contrary, is a physical fact
about which one cannot be deceived. . . ." Id. at 10-11. After Napoleon ex-
pressed his view, the law was quickly adopted with amendment omitting
the word "accidental," emphasizing "natural."
By omitting "accidental" from the list of grounds excluded, the redactors
intended to permit a ground of attack on the legitimate filiation of a child
not specifically spelled out. Thus disavowal on the ground of accidental
impotence is permitted in France, though not specified as a ground for
disavowal.
However, in practice the French might not go so far as the dictum
of the dissenting judges would indicate. See 1 PLANioL, CIVIL LAw TREATISE
Nos. 1430-33 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
Two defenses would have been raised to Mr. Tannehill's action for dis-
avowal had the case arisen in France: (1) that the "impuissance" was
natural and not accidental and (2) that even if it were deemed accidental, it
could not be urged as the condition arose before marriage. On these points,
the doctrine is divided. See 9 AUBRY wr RAu, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS at nos.
48, 67 (7th ed. Esmein 1953).
13. In 9 AusRY wT RU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS (7th ed. Esmein 1953), the
authors, in referring to the exception of accidental impotence, state "L'acci-
dent dolt avoir rendu le marl absolument incapable d'enge-nd-re.... (Emphasis
added.) rd. at 62 n. 48. In addition to referring to this impotence as one of
the husband's being incapable of engendering, rather than incapable of per-
forming the sex act, the authors refer to a case involving sterilization by
radium, decided by a court of appeal as falling within the exception of
accidental impotence.
In Latin, sterility is treated as a species of the category of impotence,
impotent4a genea'wU (the incapacity to procreate), as distinguished from
[Vol. 31
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tinction insofar as the rationale of excluding natural impotence
as a basis for disavowal is concerned, since the exclusion of
this ground in the Code Napoleon and the Louisiana Civil Code
rested on the impossibility at that time of ascertaining the nat-
ural impotence, whereas today it is possible. It is submitted that
despite the historic evidence that the word "impotence" in-
cluded "sterility," the former word is sufficiently ambiguous to
permit an interpretation excluding the latter from its prohibi-
tion by application of the principle cessante ratione legis, cessat
lex ipsa.'4 To so interpret it would bring the norms applied by
Louisiana courts more closely in accord with the traditional
civilian concept of justice.'5
In Succession of Vincent 0 an illegitimate child, whom her
father had duly acknowledged by notarial act, claimed his suc-
cession over the decedent's collateral relations. The basis of her
claim was that to deny her a right which a legitimate child
would have would be a denial of equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court in the Levy 17 and Glona'18 de-
cisions. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal denied the illegiti-
mate's claim, but an appeal has been filed with the United States
Supreme Court, which has noted probable jurisdiction. 9
While stating that it found persuasive 0 the reasoning of
the Supreme Court of North Dakota, in a decision where that
court found that the rationale of Levy and Glona extended to
impotentia coeundi (the incapacity to copulate). Most of the Romance lan-
guages use their derivatives of impotent4a in both senses, although in French,
4mputisance has taken on the primary meaning of only the incapacity to
copulate. See, e.g., the definition of impuissance in LiD PErIT LA RoussE (6th
ed. 1964).
Toullier traces the exception of impotence, the presumption of pater
eat quem nuptiae demonstrant, back to a provision of Roman law found
in the Digest (and quoted extensively in the consideration before the
Council of State) that the child is not considered that of the husband if by
reason of III health the husband is not capable of engendering life by her-
"'I ea valetudine paterfamilias fuit generare non poaslt." 1 TOULLIR, DROIT
cIVI PRANCS 252 (1833).
14. The reason of the law having ceased, the law itself ceases.
15. DiomsT 1.1.10. (Ulptanua libro primo regulatum): "[I]uris praecepta
aunt haeo: honeste vt4vere, alterum non laedere, suum cu4que tribuere." The
precepts of justice are these: to live honorably, not to harm another, to
render to each that which is his.
16. 229 So.2d 449 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
17. Levy v. Loulsiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
18. Glona v. American Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
19. Sub nomlne Labine v. Vincent, Appellate Docket Number 5257, Oc-
tober Term 1970, 39 U.S.L.W. 3146 and 3184.
20. 229 So.2d 449, 451 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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matters of inheritance as well as wrongful death,21 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal nonetheless ruled articles 206 and 919
of the Civil Code do not violate the equal protection clause be-
cause, unlike the wrongful death provision of article 2315, the
limitation of rights of inheritance of illegitimates does have a
rational relation to the legitimate state policies of encouraging
marriage so as to discourage illegitimacy and insuring stability
of land titles.22
It is difficult to see how the former rationale can withstand
constitutional objection when the Louisiana court itself describes
the policy as one that works "[t]o punish innocent children for
the fault of their parents." 23 Conceptually, the court is in error
in failing to distinguish between the deprivation of a right which
would constitute punishment and not granting a right in the
first place which might constitute discrimination but which is
not, properly speaking, punishment. If one grants the court's
assumption that the law is punishing the illegitimate child, then
one must then ask whether it is inflicting a deprivation of prop-
erty without due process.
The second justification which the court gave in defense of
the Code, that of stability of land titles, is better founded. This
reasonable state interest might have sufficed to uphold the pro-
visions of the Civil Code in question under the pre-Levy stan-
dards of equal protection that allowed states great latitude in
making reasonable classifications. 24 But the court of appeal
erred in viewing these standards as unmodified by the Levy
and Glona decisions.25 In Levy, Mr. Justice Douglas concluded
that it was invidious discrimination against illegitimates when
"no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs" was relevant to
the classification at issue.26 In the Vincent case, the court of
appeal failed to point to any such qualities of the illegitimate
that would serve to justify a distinction contrary to her interest.
21. Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861, 878 (N.D. 1968).
22. 229 So.2d 449, 451-52 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
23. Id. at 452.
24. E.g., the court of appeal in Succession of Vincent, 229 So.2d 449,
451 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) cites Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), and
United States v. Burnlson, 337 U.S. 87 (1950).
25. See note 24 supra.
26. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). The language used by Justice Douglas has
Immediate reference to the lack of relevance of the distinction between
illegitimates and legitimates "to the harm that was done their mother," but
it would be illogical to narrow the principle implicit in the statement to
something narrower than that stated in the text above.
[Vol. 31
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It is submitted that the bench and bar of Louisiana should
prepare themselves for the task of minimizing the disruptive
impact of an overruling of the Vincent case in the likely event
that the Supreme Court decides not to overrule Levy. Burnett v.
Camden,27 a recent Indiana case, may serve as a guide for Lou-
isiana courts in interpreting the equal protection requirement.
There the Supreme Court of Indiana sustained the constitution-
ality of its statute of descent and distribution which granted
illegitimates the same share as legitimates, but imposed upon
them a heavier procedural burden. 2 The United States Supreme
Court refused to overrule the Indiana court.29
Burnett v. Camden suggests that the equal protection clause
may merely require an equality of share and not an equality in
the means by which the share is claimed. Thus, Louisiana courts
could still treat illegitimates as not being seized of the succes-
sion, but rather as irregular heirs entitled to demand the same
share of an estate as a legitimate would have. In that case the
heirs would be personally obligated to pay the illegitimate's
share, but could easily dispose of property free of encumbrance
by the illegitimate's claim.
Fortunately, as the Vincent case involves an acknowledged
child, it is possible that the Supreme Court itself might do much
to limit the potentially unsettling effect of Levy in succession
matters by making it clear in its decision in Vincent that it is
invidious to discriminate between illegitimate and legitimate
children only where the former child is freely and openly
treated by the deceased as his own. It is submitted that such a
decision would be consistent with Levy, where ties of spirit or
emotion and of dependency between parent and child, as well
as of biology, were relied upon by Justice Douglas in writing
the opinion.30 Such a limitation would be wise and in the in-
terest of children conceived out of wedlock in the future, lest
unmarried pregnant women be forced to choose abortion rather
than bearing and surrendering their children for adoption from
27. 254 N.E.2d 199 (Ind. 1970), rehearing denied, 255 N.E.2d 650 (Ind.
1970).
28. The particular burden imposed on the illegitimate was that of hav-
ing to prove paternity while the alleged father was still alive. However, it
may be that other burdens would also be constitutional so long as the Ille-
gitimate were given an equal share.
29. App. dism'd, cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. June, 1970).
30. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
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fear of the public humiliation which might result from the
child's later exercising the strengthened rights of inheritance
which it would retain under article 214 of the Civil Code.
PROPERTY
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
PUBLIC THINGS
According to Louisiana civilian classification, the category
of public things includes property of the public domain, prop-
erty of the private domain, and things subject to public use,
whether they belong to a public body or to a private person.1
In the 1969-1970 term, Louisiana courts decided a number of
interesting cases dealing with property of the public domain,
such as navigable waterbottoms, and things subject to public
use, such as roads and streets, parks, cemeteries, and banks of
navigable rivers.
Navigable Waterbottoms
According to well-settled principles of Louisiana civil law,
navigable waterbottoms are things of the public domain which,
by definition, are insusceptible of private ownership.2 An in-
volved course of legislative action, however, and judicial inter-
pretation of obscure texts, have resulted in the recognition of
private ownership in beds of certain navigable waters.
Originally, the prohibition against alienation by the state
of the navigable waters was based upon the interpretation placed
by the courts on article 453 of the Civil Code. The first direct
prohibition occurred in 1886 when Act 1063 of that year declared
that the state owned all waters adjoining the Gulf and at the
same time provided that the public ownership of these waters
should be continued and maintained. Subsequently, the prohi-
bition was fortified by the judicial doctrine of "inherent sover-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CVIL LAW PROPERTY § 30 (1966).
2. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 453, 482; Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173
So. 315 (1936); State ex rel. Saint v. Timothy, 166 La. 738, 117 So. 812 (1928);
State ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919); Lou-
isiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Comm'n, 125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910); Milne
v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324 (1838). But cf. California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 734,
74 So.2d 1, 11 (1954), declaring that the bottoms of navigable lakes and bays
"are by their nature susceptible or capable of private ownership."
3. See La. Acts 1886, No. 106, now A. R.S. 49:3 (1950). See also La. Acts
1892, No. 110; La. Acts 1896, No. 121; La. Acts 1902, No. 153; La. Acts 1904,
No. 52; La. Acts 1924, No. 139; La. Acts 1932, No. 67; La. Acts 1938, No. 55.
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